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The  previous  brief  on  the  Russian  proposals 
for  a  new  security  architecture  in  Europe 
appeared  in  November  2009.1 S i n c e  t h e n ,  
Russia  presented  two  documents.  On  29 
November  2009,  Russia  introduced  a  draft 
European Security Treaty 2 to all OSCE member 
states.  Immediately  afterwards,  it  proposed  a 
draft  Agreement  on  Basic  Principles  governing 
                                                 
1 The first part appeared as Egmont Security Policy Brief # 3 on 
29 November 2009. 
2  http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml 
Relations  among  NATO-Russia  Member  States  in 
the Security Sphere to its NATO partners.  
 
On  5  February  2010,  President  Medvedev 
signed  The  Military  Doctrine  of  the  Russian 
Federation.3  On 6 February, at the 46th Munich 
Security  Conference,  the  Russian  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  Sergey  Lavrov  made  yet 
another attempt to sell Russia’s proposal for a 
new European security architecture.  
THE DRAFT EUROPEAN SECURITY 
TREATY 
The Draft Treaty is limited to one principle, 
indivisibility  of  security,  and  to  some 
generalities on crisis management.  
The  Russian  proposals  put  forward  at  the 
OSCE  Annual  Review  Conference  on  Security i n  
June  2009  focused  only  on  the  first  OSCE 
dimension, viz. hard security. However, within 
this  constraint,  it  proposed  to  address  the 
whole  spectrum  of  hard  security  challenges. 
This is no longer the case for the Draft Treaty. 
The  second  and  fourth  blocks  of  the  June 
proposal are not addressed.4 
                                                 
3 V o y e n n a y a  D o k trina  Rossiyskoy  Fyedyeratsii, 
http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461 
4  The  first  block  covered  the  basic  principles  of  relations 
between  states;  the  second  block  addressed  arms  control, 
confidence-building,  restraint  and  reasonable  sufficiency  in 
military doctrine; the third block dealt with crisis prevention and 
Part II of the Security Brief on the Russian 
proposals for a New Security Architecture for 
Europe focuses on the Russian drafts for a 
“European  Security  Treaty” a n d  f o r  a n  
“Agreement  Governing  Relations  among 
NATO-Russia Council Member States in the 
Security  Sphere.” I t  q u e s t i o n s  w h a t  a d d e d  
value,  if  any,  these  proposals  have  for 
enhancing  security  in  the  Euro-Atlantic 
region.  It  argues t h a t  t h e  C o r f u  p r o c e s s  
seems  a  more  realistic  way  forward.  It 
should  focus  on  pragmatic  adaptations  of 
existing  institutions,  procedures a n d  
instruments in order to overcome Cold War 
stereotypes  that  still  survive  two  decades 
after the implosion of the Soviet Union.  
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The  central  theme  is  indivisible,  equal  and 
undiminished  security.  “Any  security  measures 
taken by a Party to the Treaty individually or together 
with other Parties, including in the framework of any 
international o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  o r  
coalition, shall be implemented with due regard to the 
security interests of all other Parties.” (Art 1). 
“A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate 
in  or  support  any  actions  or  activities  affecting 
significantly the security of any other Party or Parties to 
the  Treaty.  No  signatory  will  allow  the  use  of  his 
territory  or  use  the  territory  of  another  signatory  to 
launch an armed attack against one or more parties to 
the Treaty” (Art 2). 
“A Party to the Treaty shall be entitled to information 
on any measure taken by the other Party that might 
affect its security” (Art 3). 
Furthermore,  the  Draft  Treaty  provides  for 
general  procedures  for  crisis  prevention  and 
crisis  management  to s e t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  o r  
disputes that might arise between the Parties. It 
proposes  Consultations  among  Parties i f  a  p a r t y  
determines  that  there  exists  a  violation  or  a 
threat of violation of the Treaty by any other 
Party  or  Parties.  Any  participant  to  the 
consultations could convene a Conference of the 
Parties “to consider the issue that was the subject of 
these consultations”. In case of an armed attack or 
the threat of an armed attack, the Party under 
attack  or  under  threat  shall  bring  it  to  the 
attention of the depository who will convene 
an Extraordinary Conference of the Parties (Art 4-6). 
The Draft also provides the possibility for each 
Party to consider an armed attack against any 
other Party as an attack against itself. It shall be 
entitled to render the attacked Party assistance, 
including armed support, according to its right 
of  self-defence  under  article  51  of  the  UN 
Charter (Art 7).  
 
 
                                                                    
management; and the fourth block was dedicated to measures to 
counter new threats, including proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction,  terrorism,  drug  trafficking  and  transborder 
organized crime (See Security Policy Brief # 3). 
THE  DRAFT  AGREEMENT  GOVERNING 
RELATIONS  AMONG  NATO-RUSSIA 
COUNCIL MEMBER STATES 
Practically  immediately  after  presenting  the 
Draft  Treaty  to  the  OSCE  members,  Russia 
introduced a draft Agreement on Basic Principles 
Governing  Relations  among  NATO-Russia  Council 
Member States in the Security Sphere. This proposal 
attempts  to  provide  Russia  with  a  say  in 
NATO’s  decision-making,  defence  planning 
and military deployment. 
Once  again,  the  basic  principle  is  equal  and 
indivisible security. Members shall not enhance 
their  own  security  at  the  expense  of  the 
security of others. 
The  Parties  shall  set  up  and  maintain 
mechanisms to harmonize measures to prevent 
and  settle  conflicts.  They  will  exchange  their 
assessments of current threats and challenges 
on a regular basis. They will agree on measures 
to counter these threats and challenges without 
violating  legitimate  security  interests  of  other 
states. Any Party can convene an extraordinary 
meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in case 
of  threats  to  security  or  of  the  use  of  force 
against one of the Parties. 
The  Parties  shall  not  regard  each  other  as 
opponents.  Military  capacity  will  be 
proportionate  to  their  legitimate  security 
requirements.  The  Parties  will “ p e r f o r m  d e f e n s e  
planning in a way that it does not threaten the security 
of other parties.”5 Parties will hold consultations 
on defence planning to avoid incidents ensuing 
from military actions.  
All parties will abstain from stationing sizeable 
forces permanently in countries that were not 
members of NATO before 27 May 1997.6 The 
limits proposed by Russia are very low, namely 
at  the  level  of  one  brigade,  wing  or  attack 
helicopter  battalion.  “Permanent  basis” 
includes temporary deployment of more than 
42 days. Exceptionally, in case of a threat to 
the security of one or more Parties, and with 
                                                 
5 James G. Neuger, NATO to Rebuff Russian Bid for Separate Treaty, 
Officials Say, Bloomberg.com, 18 January 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a
MDbZTRCWiGQ#  
6  Date  of  the  Founding  Act  on  Mutual  Relations,  Cooperation  and 
Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris.  
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the consent of all Parties, larger deployments 
may take place. 
Furthermore,  all  Parties  should  cooperate  in 
arms  control.  However,  no  more  details  are 
provided. 
In other words, Russia wishes to have a say in 
the  Alliance’s  defence  planning  and 
deployment of military forces. Furthermore, it 
would have to be consulted if NATO wishes 
to undertake actions. 
LAVROV’S  SPEECH  AT  THE  MUNICH 
SECURITY CONFERENCE 
The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey 
Lavrov  addressed  the  46th M u n i c h  S e c u r i t y  
Conference on 6 February 2010.7 He reiterated 
most of the arguments already put forward on 
previous  occasions,  such  as  in  President 
Medvedev’s speeches, his own intervention at 
the OSCE Annual Review Conference in 2009, 
and the drafts submitted in the OSCE and the 
NATO-Russia Council. 
However, he gave some additional arguments, 
mainly  to  counter  criticisms  that h a d  a r i s e n  
since  the  presentation  of  both  draft 
documents. 
With regard to human rights, Lavrov explained 
the  Russian  contention  formulated  at  the 
Annual  Review  Conference  on  Security  in 
Vienna in June 2009 that “the last two baskets did 
not suffer from erosion of the fundamental principles”. 
He  underlined  that  the  lion’s  share  of  the 
OSCE  programmes  does  not  reflect  a 
comprehensive  approach  to  security,  but 
concentrates  on  humanitarian  affairs  to  the 
detriment of the other baskets. Human rights, 
however,  already  have  a  legally  binding 
framework  in  the  Council  of  Europe 
constituting  “a  single,  common  legal  humanitarian 
space of the continent. […] In other words, it is in the 
realm of ‘soft security’ that a pan-European structure 
has  long  been  established  and  works  quite  well, 
                                                 
7 http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005
bcbb3/93d5f2c4bfa144dec32576c4005a77f8?OpenDocument  
ensuring compliance with the commitments in the field 
of human rights and freedoms”.8 
Lavrov also explains the limited scope of the 
hard  security  issues  addressed  in  the  Draft 
Treaty.  Initially  Russia  wanted  to  include  all 
major aspects of politico-military issues, such 
as arms control, confidence-building measures, 
conflict  resolution  and  responses  to 
contemporary  threats  and  challenges.  The 
reason it limited the Draft to the principle of 
the indivisibility of security and some general 
ideas on crisis management is that, after having 
“listened to our colleagues, we agreed to include them in 
the Corfu Process. […] And in the Draft Treaty we 
have left no practical things, but only one principle – 
the principle of the indivisibility of security”. 
Soon after the launch of the Corfu Process, the 
Russian  Permanent  Representative  to t h e  
OSCE  had  already  stressed  that  Russia 
considers  its  proposal  regarding  a  European 
Security  Treaty  and  the  Corfu  Process  as 
complementary:  
“as  mutually  overlapping  but  not  mutually 
replaceable approaches. The difference is simple: the 
Treaty on European Security is a document drawn 
up  with  the  involvement  of  all  the  international 
structures of the Euro-Atlantic region, while the 
‘Corfu  Meetings’ a r e  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  
framework of the OSCE covering a broad agenda 
that  includes  the  enhancement  of  the 
Organization’s  effectiveness  and  its  three 
‘baskets’”.9 
Lavrov  concludes  by  putting  the  onus  for 
adapting  to  a  globalized,  polycentric  and 
increasingly  competitive  world,  and 
strengthening  the  position  of  European 
civilization,  on  the  West.  He  considers  the 
acceptance of the Russian proposal as “a kind 
of a test of the Euro-Atlantic ‘family’ for maturity, for 
their ability to adequately perceive what is happening in 
the world”. Not accepting the Russian proposals 
                                                 
8 On 18 February, Russia signed Protocol 14 on the reforms of 
the  European  Court  for  Human  Rights,  opening  the  way  to 
reforms of the Court. 
9 Statement by Vladimir Voronkov at the Joint Meeting of the 
OSCE  Forum  for  Security  Co-operation  and  the  OSCE 
Permanent Council, 15 September 2009,  
http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2009/09/39603_en.pdf  
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would  prevent  a  single  pan-European  space 
developing and would lead to “spheres of influence 
and areas in which different standards apply in terms of 
military  and  political  security,  humanitarian 
obligations, access to markets and modern technology”.  
EVALUATION OF THE RUSSIAN DRAFT 
PROPOSAL 
The Draft Treaty 
As argued in the previous security brief on this 
subject,  it  is  questionable  what  the  benefit 
would be of a legally binding treaty. Anyhow, 
the  content  of  the  Draft  Treaty  is 
disappointing.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what 
problems could be solved by the proposal. On 
the contrary, it would open up the possibility 
for  any  Party  to  the  Treaty  to  enter  into 
endless  discussions  in  the  name  of  the 
principle of the indivisibility of security.  
Furthermore,  if  the  Draft  Treaty  were  to  be 
enacted  as  proposed,  it  would  place  itself 
above  the  existing  treaties  whose  members 
would  have  to  place  their  allegiance  to  the 
European Security Treaty above their duties to 
other  organizations  and  treaties.  In  fact,  the 
ultimate  objective  seems  to  be  to  neutralize 
other  treaties  or  at  least  their  security  and 
defence clauses. This does not seem a realistic 
prospect  in  any  near  future.  A  European 
Security  Treaty,  as  proposed  by  Medvedev, 
would more likely end up, if not in oblivion 
then  as  documents  with  little  practical  value, 
like the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe 
and the European Security Charter of 1999.10 
In this respect, it would be interesting to apply 
the Draft Treaty by way of trial to the war in 
Georgia. The many appeals by Georgia in the 
years before 2008 to change the composition 
and  terms  of  reference  of  the  peacekeeping 
force  should  have  been  dealt w i t h  b y  
consultations  and  a  conference.  Immediately 
after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  a  special 
conference  should  have  been  convened. 
However, should this have been in August or 
                                                 
10  Dmitri  Trenin,  From  a  “Treaty  to  Replace  All  Treaties”  to 
Addressing Europe’s Core Security Issues, Carnegie Moscow Center, 
30 November 2009,  
http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/83465.htm. 
earlier,  when  incidents  were  becoming  more 
frequent?  Furthermore,  one  could  argue  that 
members  of  the  OSCE  could  have  rendered 
(armed) assistance to Georgia, especially once 
Russian  troops  crossed  the  boundary  of  the 
South  Ossetian  part  of  Georgia,  penetrated 
deeper  into  Georgian  territory  and  attacked 
targets in the whole country. 
The Draft Agreement within the 
NATO-Russia Council 
Most of the proposals of the Draft Agreement 
are  already  part  of  the  Founding  Act  of  the 
NATO-Russia  Council.11 H o w e v e r ,  t h e  n e w  
proposal would give Russia a say in NATO’s 
decision-making a n d  r e s t r i c t  d e p loyment  of  its 
armed forces. This is unacceptable not only for 
NATO, but also for the EU.  
Consultations  and  exchange  of  threat 
assessments  are  already  part  of  the  NATO-
Russia Council’s work. However, consultations 
on  defence  planning  would  open  up  a 
completely new area for endless discussions.  
 
Furthermore,  the  statement  that  the  Parties 
shall  not  consider  each  other  as  opponents 
seems  completely  at  odds  with  The  Military 
Doctrine  of  the  Russian  Federation  signed  by 
President  Medvedev  on  5  February  2010. 
Article 8 of the Military Doctrine singles out 
NATO  as  the  major  external  danger.12 I t  
identifies  explicitly  as  the  foremost  danger 
NATO’s aspiration to take on a global role in 
halting  the  infringement  of  the  norms  of 
international  law.  Other  dangers  emanating 
from NATO are the approaching of its military 
infrastructure  to  the  borders  of  the  Russian 
Federation  and  NATO  expansion.13 
Furthermore,  it  mentions  the e x p a n s i o n  o f  
                                                 
11 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security 
between  NATO  and  the  Russian  Federation, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm. 
12 In Russian terminology, military danger does not automatically 
imply  a  clear  threat.  The  Military  Doctrine m a k e s  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between  threat  and  danger:  “a  military  danger  is  a  condition  of 
intergovernmental  or  interstate  relations  characterised  by  a  set  of  factors, 
capable  under  certain  conditions  to  lead  to  the  occurrence  of  a  military 
threat”. A  m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t  i s  “ characterised  by  a  real  possibility  of 
occurrence of military conflict” (Art 6.b). 
13 President Medvedev downplayed casting NATO in the role of 
the main danger to Russia in an interview to Paris-Match, 18 
February 2010, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2010/02/25/0900_type82
916_224466.shtml.  
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military  contingents  of  foreign s t a t e s  a n d  
groups of states in territories adjacent to the 
Russian  Federation  and  the  territories  of  its 
allies,  as  well  as  in  adjoining  maritime  areas. 
Less direct, but nevertheless relating to NATO 
and  the  US,  is  the  mention  of  attempts  to 
destabilise  conditions  in  separate  states  and 
regions  and  to  undermine  strategic  stability, 
among  others  by  means  of  strategic  antimissile 
defence. (Sec II, Par 8).14 
 
The  second  main  area  of  interference  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  the  Alliance  would  be  in 
limiting deployment in the territories of “new” 
members.  Russia  often  mentions  NATO’s 
promise not to station troops on the territory 
of new members in exchange for accepting the 
unification  of  Germany  and  the  former  East 
Germany  joining  NATO.  However,  the  only 
written  commitment  by  the  Allies  in  the 
Founding  Act o f  t h e  N A T O -Russia  Council 
relates to nuclear weapons. Yet, the Founding 
Act also states that “in the current and foreseeable 
security  environment,  the  Alliance  will  carry  out  its 
collective  defence  and  other  missions  by  ensuring  the 
necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for 
reinforcement  rather  than  by  additional  permanent 
stationing  of  substantial  combat  forces.  However, 
reinforcements  may  take  place  in  event  of  threat  of 
aggression and missions in support of peace consistent 
with  the  UN  Charter  and  the  OSCE  governing 
principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the 
Adapted  CFE  Treaty  and  the  1994  Vienna 
Document” (Section IV, Par 11). This does not, 
however,  imply  any  right  of  interference  for 
Russia in NATO’s affairs. 
 
The  Russian  proposals  in  the  NATO-Russia 
Council would also have a negative impact on 
the CSDP. Defence planning within the EU is 
closely linked to that in NATO. Moreover, it 
would  be  unacceptable  that,  once  the  CSDP 
matures, the EU could not deploy forces of its 
NATO-members  wherever  it  deemed 
necessary on the whole territory of the Union, 
of  course  taking  into  account  existing 
                                                 
14 This identification of NATO as the main military danger, or at 
least  putting  NATO  on  top  of  the  list  of  dangers,  is  also  in 
contradiction  with  the  Founding  Act  of  the  NATO-Russia 
Council (Par 2). 
agreements on arms control, and security and 
confidence-building measures.15 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  draft  documents  submitted  by  Russia 
make it clear that it is proposing a new tier to 
the European security architecture that stands 
above  all  existing  security  arrangements. 
Furthermore, it is attempting to get a say in 
NATO’s affairs. 
A  European  Security  Treaty  would  take 
precedence over existing defence and security 
agreements. For this reason, the proposal for a 
European Security Treaty seems a non-starter. 
Furthermore,  any  general  accord  that  would 
only  come  about  in  order  to  placate  Russia, 
would  not  contribute  anything  tangible  to 
peace and security.  
The only really new proposals in Russia’s draft 
for  an  Agreement  in  the  NATO-Russia 
Council — those on decision-making, defence 
planning and deployment — are unacceptable, 
not only for NATO but also for the EU. 
The  main  security  issue  in  the  Euro-Atlantic 
area  remains  the  lack  of  trust.  The  West 
suspects  Russia  of  imperialist  motives  in  its 
near abroad and of trying to regain influence in 
Central Europe. Russia, in turn, cannot accept 
Western attempts of gaining influence in the 
former  Soviet  space.  Especially  NATO-
enlargement  and  NATO-infrastructure 
approaching  the  Russian  border  are 
unpalatable.  Before  any  real  progress  can  be 
made in the field of security, trust has to be 
rebuilt  and  Cold  War  stereotypes,  which  still 
survive two decades after the implosion of the 
Soviet Union, have to overcome. 
Russia  views  its  proposal  for  a  European 
Security  Treaty  and  the  Corfu  Process  as 
complementary.  Nevertheless,  adapting 
existing structures, procedures and instruments 
through  the  Corfu  process  seems  a  more 
                                                 
15  Article  42  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  states  that  “1.  The  common 
security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign 
and  security  policy.  […]  7.  If  a  Member  State  is  the  victim  of  armed 
aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an 
obligation  of  aid  and  assistance  by  all  the  means  in  their  power,  in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain 
Member States”.  
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realistic  way  forward  than  a  new  European 
Security  Treaty.  The  recommendation 
formulated  in  the  previous  Security  Brief 
remains  valid.  The  West  should  participate 
sincerely  in  order  to  reach  concrete  results 
enhancing security in the Euro-Atlantic region. 
However,  it  should  not  fall  for  the  ploy  of 
linking a European Security Treaty with a “test 
of  the  members  of  the  Euro-Atlantic  ‘family’  for 
maturity […]”.   
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